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l\Iay 1963] PEOPLE v. HAVEN 713 
159 C.2d 713; 3i Cal.RJ>tr. 47. 381 P.2d 927] 
[Crim. No. 7312. In Bank. May 29, 1963.] 
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respor.dent, v. ROBERT L. 
HA VEN, Defendant and Appellant. 
[1] Searches and Seizures-Reasonableness.-An accused makes a 
prima facie case that a search and seizure were illegal when 
he establishes that they were made without a warrant, and the 
burden thereafter rests on the prosecution to show proper 
justification. 
[2] Arrest-Without Warrant-Probable Cause.-In a narcotics 
prosecution, it was not ('~tahli~hed that the officers had probahle 
cause to arn'st defendant when they entered his house without 
a warrant where their testimony was barren of the details of 
information they had received a week or more before the 
arrest concerning defendant's narcotic activity, thus making 
it impossible for the trial court to determine whether that 
information would justify a reasonable belief of defendant's 
guilt, where the officers, during their surveillance of defendant's 
house a week before the arrest, saw eight persons enter and 
leave the house in a 10 to 12 hour period, but six persons lived 
in the house and the four or five who were known to have been 
engaged in or who were suspected of being engaged in the 
narcotics traffic presumably included defendant and his wife, 
both of whom had previous narcotics records, and where no 
explanation was given for the delay of a week between sur-
veillance and arrest. 
[3a,3b] Searches and Seizures-Consent.-In a narcotics prosecu-
tion, consent to police officers' entry into defendant's house on 
the day of his arrest was not established where it appeared that 
an officer, after ringing the bell and knocking but receiving no 
response, found the door ajar and entered the house before 
defendant or his wife had any opportunity to object, and where 
it was probable that he was in the house before they were even 
aware of his presence. 
[4] Id.-Investigations Falling Short of Search.-The right to seek 
interviews with suspects or witnesses at their homes does not 
include the right to walk in uninvited merely because there is 
no response to a knock or a ring. 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Arrest, § 10; Am.Jur.2d, Arrest, § 44. 
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Searches ,and Seizurfls, § 40; Am.Jur., 
Searches and Seizures (1st ed § 71). 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Searches and Seizures, § 19; [2] 
Arrest, § 12(14); [3, ;), 6, 9] Senrchf's and Spizures, ~ 22; [4] 
Searches and Seizures, § 6; [7,8] Searches and Seizures, § 24. 
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[5] Id.-Oonsent.-Where defendant was suddenly confronted by 
five police officers who had entered his house unlawfully, with-
out right or permission, the officers could not rely on defend-
ant's consent to a search of his p<'rson; the substantial 
probability that the unlawful entry was essential to sccuring 
consent and the inescapable uncertainty whether the consent 
was voluntary precluded treating the consent as an independent 
valid basis for the ensuing search of defendant's person. 
[6] Id.-Oonsent.-A search and seizure made pursuant to consent 
secured immediately following an illegal entry or arrest is 
inextricably bound up with the illegal conduct and cannot be 
segregated therefrom, and is therefore invalid. (Disapproving 
language to the contrary in People v. Rayford, 189 Cal.App.2d 
474,477 [11 Cal.Rptr. 427] ; People Y. Zavalefa, 182 Cal.App.2d 
422, 429 [6 Cal.Rptr. 166); People v. Lucas, 180 Cal.App.2d 
723,726-727 [-1 Cnl.Hptr. I!lS]; l'('olile v. [(ii'f!, 175 Cnl.App.2d 
386, 389 [346 P.2d 235); People Y. Rodriguez, 168 Cal.App.2d 
452, 457 [336 P.2d 266] ; People v. Hicks, 165 Cal.App.2d 548, 
550-551 (331 P.2d 1003J ; People \'. I1Ielody, 161 Cal.App.2d 7:!S, 
734 [331 P.2d 72).) 
[7a, 7b] Id.-Incidental to Arrest.-A search of a hotel room, the 
key to which was found in defendant's pocket during a search 
of him at his home, was not justified as incidental to defend-
ant's arrest, whether such arrest took place at his house or at 
the hotel room, where the hotel room was at a distance from 
defendant's house, and where the officers did not take defendant 
to the hotel and enter the hotel room to arrest him but to con-
duct a search, the arrest, which was made after marijuana was 
found in the room, thus being at most an incident of the search 
and not available as a pretext to justify it. 
[8] Id.-Ineidental to Arrest.-When it appears that a search and 
not an arrest was the real object of officers in entering on prem-
ises, and that the arrest was a pretext for or at the most an 
incident of the search, the search is not reasonable within the 
meaning of the Constitution. 
[9] Id.-Consent.-There was no sufficient showing that defendant 
consented to a search of a hotel room, the key to which was 
found in his pocket during a search of him at his home, where 
defendant's consent to the search at his home was vitiated by 
the officers' unlawful entry and did not even purport to author-
ize the officers to search the hotel room, and where defendant's 
attempt 'to divert the officers from the room by walking past 
the door of the hotel made it clear that he did not wish the 
room searched. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the 
City and County of San Francisco. Charles S. Peery, Judge. 
Reversed. 
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Prosecution for illegal possession of marijuana. Judgment of 
conviction reversed. 
Russell Bruno, unde! appointment by the Supreme Court, 
for Defendant and Appellant. 
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, John S. McInerny, John 
F. Foran and Albert 'V. Harris, Deputy Attorneys General, 
for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-A jury found defendant guilty of posses-
sion of marijuana in violation of Health and Safety Code, 
section 11530. He admitted a prior conviction of violating 
Health and Safety Code, section 11500, and the trial court 
sentenced him to prison for the term prescribed by law. He 
appeals, cOllh'ndillg tllat the marijuana introduced in evidence 
against him was obtained by an illegal search and seizure." 
Inspector Kl'rl'igan of the Narcotics Detail of the San Fran-
cisco Police Department testified that he received information 
that defelldp.nt had nareoties at a house on Army Street. On 
September 25, HJ61, be and several other narcotics officers 
placed the house uuder surveillance for from 10 to 12 hours. 
They observed about eigllt persons, including defendant, 
enter and leave. l'''ou1' or five were known to the officers as 
having been engaged in narcotics traffic or being suspected 
thereof. Defendant testified that the officers entered and 
searched the premises on September 25, but found no nar-
coties and made no arrests. Neither of the officers who testified 
mentioned a search on that date . 
.A week laL'r, on OctobPr 2, Inspector Kerrigan returned to 
the house in the afternoon with Inspector Arieta of the San 
Franciseo police, two state narcotics officers, and one federal 
narcotics officer. They had no warrant. Inspector Kerrigan 
testified that he went to the front door with one of the state 
officers. He knocked and rang the bell but received no 
answer. The door was open about 2 inches, and he could see 
defendant and his wife through a hallway in the kitchen at 
the back of the house. Defendant was sitting at a table and 
, 
*The trial court admitted the evidence over objection after a hearing 
outside tile presence of the jury. "Thc procedure adopted by the trial 
court was proper, for the admissibility of thc evidence presented a ques-
tion of law for the court." (People v. Goru, 4[) Ca1.2d 776, 780 [291 P.2d 
469].) 
) 
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his wife was cooking. Inspector Kerrigan push~d the door 
open, displayed his badgl', and ~aid, ,. Police Offic~r. I would 
like to talk to you." He entl'red the house and defendant 
said, " 'What do you wallt~' I a8kl·d him who he was. III' 
said, 'Robert Haven.' I said, 'I would like to talk to you.' 
He said, "What about?' I said, 'I am a narcotic officer.' " 
They went into the living room, and Illsp('ctor Ari('ta and the 
state and federal officers then entered the hous('. 
Inspector Aricta questioned defendant about narcotics. Ho 
testified that defendant told him there were no narcotics in 
the house and that he would not keep them there because of 
the children and because it was his mother-in-law's house. He 
admitted that he had an outfit for taking narcotics and pro-
duced it from undl'r a mattress. The officer examined defend-
ant's arm and saw puncture marks. He searched him and 
found a key in his pocket with no identifying marks. De-
fendant told him that he thought it was a key to his mother's 
house. The officl'l" asked defl'ndant'8 wife about the key, and 
she replied that defendant had a room in a hotel on Mission 
Street. Defendant denied any knowledge of a hotel room. 
The officers took defendant and his wife in separate cars to 
the hotel on Mission Street. Defendant and two officers ap-
proached the hotel door, def('ndant walked past it, and one of 
the officers called him back. He walked up the stairs with the 
officers to room 205, one of the officers opened the door with 
the key, and they all entered. The officers found marijuana 
in the pocket of a coat in the closet. Inspector Kerrigan 
testified that defendant admitted that the coat and marijuana 
were his. 
Inspector Arieta testified that defendant consented to the 
search of his person and to going with the officers to the hote1. 
Drfendant testified that he did not consent to the seareh of 
his person, that Inspector Arleta ordered him to come with 
the officers to the hotel, and that" I didn't argile with him." 
He also testified that the coat and marijuana were not his and 
denied that he had told the officers that they were. 
Defendant contends that the officers' entry into the Army 
Street house was unlawful and that therefore the ensuing 
st'arches,of his person and of the hotel room were also unlaw-
ful whether or not he consented thereto. In any event, he 
COil tends that there is no evidence that he consented to the 
:';t'IlI'ch of the hotel room. The Attorney Grneral contends 
that the officers had probable cause to enter the Army Street 
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house to Ill'rl'st defendant, that the search of the hotel room 
was justified as incidl'ntal to dl'fl'ndant's al'l'l'st, and that even 
if it was IIOt, the marijualla was lawfully obtained pursuant 
to defendant's consent. 
[!] Defendant made a prima facie ease that the search and 
seizure were illegal when 11(' ('stablished that they were made 
without a warrant. The bUl'i1t'n then rested on the prosecution 
to show proper justification. (Tompkins v. Superior Court, 
ante, pp. 65, 67 l27 Cal.Rptr. 889, 378 P.2d 113] ; Badillo Y. 
Supc1'ior Court, 46 Cal.2d 269,272 [294 P.2d 23].) 
[2] The prosecution did not establish that the officers 
had probable cause to arrest defendant when they entered the 
Army Strel't h011se Oil Oeir)ber 2. Their testimony was bar-
ren of the details of the information they llad received a week 
or more beforl', and it was therl'fore impossible for the trial 
court to dl'tl'rmine whether that information would justify a 
rcaf!OnabJe bl'lit'f of defendant's guilt. (People v. Boyles, 45 
Cal.2d 652,656 [290 P.2d 535] ; People v. Gora, 45 Ca1.2d 776, 
782 [291 P.2d 469J.) Nor did their surveillance a week before 
the arrest provide reasonable cause. Although eight persons 
Wf're seen to enter and IE'ave the house in a 10 to 12-hour 
period, six persons lived there including three minor chil-
dren and def('ndant's wife and mother-in-law. The four or 
five who were known to have been engaged in or who were 
suspcct('d of being cngaged in the narcotics traffic presum-
ably included defendant and his wife, both of whom had previ-
(lUS narcotics records. For all that appears, the others who 
werc obs('rved were snspected mE-rely because they came to 
the house. Moreover, no explanation was given for the delay 
of a week between surveillance and arrest. If, as defendant 
testified without contradiction, the officers searched the prem-
is('s on September 25 and found no narcotics, the information 
upon which they acted may have been proved false before 
tlwy rpturnrd on Octoher 2. 
[3a] The prosl'cution also failed to establish consent to 
the officers' entry into the house on the day of the arrest. 
[4] The right to sel'k interviews with suspects or witnesses 
at thf'ir hOllWS dOt>'!; not include the right to walk in uniuvit('d 
merely because there is no response to a knock or a ring. 
(People v. Michael, 45 Ca1.2d 751, 753-754 [290 P.2d 
832J.) - [3b] In the prescnt case it clearly appears that In-
l>pcctor Kerrigan entered the house before defendant or his 
wife had auy opportunity to object, and it seems most prob-
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able that he was in the house before they were even aware of 
his presence. There is no evidence whatever that they con-
sented to his entry or the entry of the four other officers a fe\v 
minutes later. 
[5] Since the officers' presence in the house was unlawful, 
they could not rely on defendant's consent to search. Since 
he was suddenly confronted by five officers who lJad entered 
without right or permission, it was equivocal at best whether 
Ids apparent consent to being searched was voluntary. The 
substantial probability that the unlawful entry was essential 
to securing consent and the inescapable uncertainty whether 
the consent was voluntary preclude treating the consent as an 
independent valid basis for the ensuing search of defend-
ant's person. Accordingly, the consent, the search, the finding 
of the key, and the resultillg discovery of the marijuana in 
the hotel room were all products of the officers' unlawful 
entry and cannot be relied upon to sllstain the judgment. 
(Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 [83 S.Ot. 407, 416-
417, 9 L.Ed.2d 441] ; Work v. United States, 243 F.2d 660, 
662; Takahashi v. United States, 143 F.2d 118, 122; United 
States v. Watson, 189 F.Supp. 776, 7S1; People v. Wilson, 
145 Oal.App.2d 1, 7 [301 P.2d 974] ; cf. People Y. Burch, 196 
Oal.App.2d 754, 767 [17 Oal.Rptr. 102]; see also Jackson, J., 
concurring in McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 459 
[69 S.Ot. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153, 158J ; Britt v. Superior Coud, 58 
Oa1.2d 469, 473 [24 Oal.Rptr. 849, 374 P.2d 817] ; People v. 
Dixon, 46 Oa1.2d 456, 458 [296 P.2d 557J ; Badillo v. Superior 
Court, 46 Oa1.2d 269,273 [294 P.2d23].) 
[6] It is true that there is language in several cases to 
the effect that a search or seizure made pursuant to consent is 
valid even though the consent was given immediately after 
an unlawful entry or arrest. (People v. Rayford, 189 Oal. 
App.2d 474, 477 [11 Oa1.Rptr. 427] ; People v. Zavaleta, 182 
Oal.App.2d 422, 429 [6 Oal.Rptr. 166] ; People v. Lucas, 180 
Ca1.App.2d 723, 726-727 [4 Oal.Rptr. 798] ; People v. King, 
175 Oal.App.2d 386,389 [346 P.2d 235] ; People v. Rodriguez, 
168 Cal.kpp.2d 452, 457 [336 P.2d 266]; People v. Hicks, 
165 Cal.App.2d 548, 550-551 [331 P.2d 1003J ; People v. Mel-
ody, 164 Oal.App.2d 728, 734 [331 P.2d 72].) In most of 
these cases, however, the language was not necessary to the 
decision. It appears to reflect a mechanical extension of the 
rule that probable cause to arrest or a warrant is not required 
to justify a search when consent to the search is given before 
) 
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the officer enters and searches or makes an arrest. (See People 
v. Michael, 45 Ca1.2d 751, 754 [290 P.2d 852]; People v. 
Burke,47 Ca1.2d 45, 49 [301 P.2d 241].) A search or seizure 
made pursuant to a valid consent before any illegal police 
conduct occurs is obviously not a product of illegal conduct. 
A search and seizure made pursuant to consent secured im-
mediately following an illegal entry or arrest, however, is in-
extricably bound up with the illegal conduct and cannot be 
segregated therefrom. Accordingly, language in the cited 
cases to the contrary is disapproved. 
[78,] Even if we were to hold that defendant's consent 
justified the officers' investigation at the Army Street house 
and that the evidence there uncovered constituted reasonable 
cause to believe that defendant was guilty of possession of nar-
cotics, the search of the hotel room would nevertheless be 
unlawful. If, as defendant contends, he was arrested at the 
Army Street house, a search of the hotel room at a distance 
therefrom could not be justified as incidental to the arrest. 
(Castaneda v. Superior Court, ante, pp. 439, 442 [30 Cal. 
Rptr. 1, 380 P.2d 641]; Tompkins v. Superior Court, ante, 
pp. 65, 67 [27 Cal.Rptr. 889, 378 P.2d 113]; People v. 
Gorg, 45 Ca1.2d 776, 781 [291 P.2d 469].) If, as the officers 
testified, defendant was not arrested until the marijuana was 
found in the hotel room, the search could still not be justi-
fied as incidental to his arrest. It could not be justified by 
what it turned up. (People v. Brown, 45 Ca1.2d 640, 643-
645 [290 P.2d 528]; Tompkins v. Superior Court, ante, 
pp. 65, 68 [27 Cal.Rptr. 889, 378 P.2d 113].) Moreover, 
even if the officers had probable cause to arrest before discov-
ering the marijuana, they were not entitled to delay making a 
formal arrest until they had taken defendant from the house 
to the hotel to justify a search of the hotel room as incidental 
to an arrest there. "An arrest may not be used as a pretext 
to search for evidence." (United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 
U.S. 452, 467 [52 S.Ct. 420, 76 L.Ed. 877, 82 A.L.R. 775] ; 
People v. Roberts, 47 Ca1.2d 374, 378 [303 P.2d 721] ; People 
v. SchaumlofJcJ, 53 Ca1.2d 96,101 [346 P.2d 393].) [8] "It 
is settled law that 'when it appears, as it does here, that the 
search and not the arrest was the real object of the officers in 
entering upon the premises, and that the arrest was a pretext 
for or at the most an incident of the search,' the search is 
not reasonable within the meaning of the Constitution. Hen-
derson v. United States (4th Cir.) 12 F.2d 528, 531 [51 A.L.R. 
720 .PEOPLE v. HAVEN [59 C.2d 
420]." (McKnight v. United States, 183 ~'.2d 977, 9i8.) 
[7b] In the present case, the officers did not take defendant 
to the hotel and enter the hotel room to arrest him but to con-
duct a search. The arrest was at most an incident of the 
search, and it may not be used as a pretext to justify it. 
[9] Accordingly, even if we were to assnme, contrary to our 
holding herein, that the finding of the key and the resulting 
discovery of the marijuana in the hotel room were not the 
product of the unlawful entry into the Army Street house, 
the search of the hotel room without a warrant could be 
justified only by a valid consent. 
Defendant's consent to the search at the Army Street house, 
however, was not only vitiated by the unlawful entry, but it 
did not even purport to authorize the officers to search the 
hotel room. Defendant did not give the officers permission 
to search the hotel room or to use his key to gain entrance 
thereto, and by attempting to divert them from it, he made it 
clear that he did not wish the room searched. In this respect 
this case is controlled by Castaneda v. Superior Court, 
ante, pp. 439, 443 [30 Cal. Rp tr. 1, 380 P.2d 641], where 
we stated: "We do not condone petitioner's efforts to 
mislead the officers. It bears emphasis, however, that peti-
tioner was under no duty to assist the officers in securing evi-
dence against him. Since the search was not incident to his 
arrest, he had the right to have a magistrate determine 
whether there was reasonable cause to search his home and 
whether a search warrant should therefore issue. (Chapman 
v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 613-616 [81 S.Ct. 776, 5 
L.Ed.2d 828, 831-833] ; Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 
13-15 [68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436, 439-440] ; Agnello v. United 
States, 269 U.S. 20, 32-33 [46 S.Ct. 4, 70 L.Ed. 145, 148-149, 
51 A.L.R. 409, 413-414].) '''Absent some grave emergency, 
the Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate between 
the citizen and the police. This was done not to shield crimi-
nals nor to make the home a safe haveu for illegal activities. 
It was done so that an objective mind might weigh the need 
to invade that privacy in order to enforce the law. The right 
of privacy wv,s deemed too precious to entrust to the discretion 
of those whose job is the detection of crime and the arrest of 
criminals.'" (People v. Tarantino, 45 Ca1.2d 590, 594 [290 
P.2d 505J, quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 
455 [69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153, 158].) Petitioner did not 
forfeit that right by his efforts to mislead the officers." 
) 
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The burden wus on the prosl'cntioll to prove a valid eonsent 
to the sl>urch. It failed to disehal'gc that burdcn. 
The juugment is revel·sed. 
Gibp'm, C. J., Pt'tt>rs,J., 1'obriuer, J., and Peek, J., con-
curred. 
:\IcCOMB, J.-I dissent. 
The record in the inst.ant Cm-lll fails to diselose that defend-
ant requested any instructions to the jury, and there has not 
bC'E'n prepared and preseuted to this court a copy of any oral 
instructions given by tIle trial judge to tIle jury. 
'Vhere the instrnctions giwn or refused do not constitute 
part of the record, an appellate court will assume tlJat cor-
rect instruetions were given to the jury. (Code Civ. Proc .. 
§ 1963, subd. 15; People V. Corcllcvsky, 124 Cal.App.2d 19, 
24 [10] [267 P.2d 1048] ; l'coplc v. Jack.~on, 88 Cal.App.2d 
747,750 [3] [199 P.2d 322J ; 4 Cal.Jur.2<l (1952) Appeal and 
Error, § 589, p. 46G; cf. In rc Patte/'son, 58 Cal.2d 848, 853 
[7] [27 Ca1.Rptr.10, 377 P.2<1 74J.) 
Aecordingly, in additioll to thr evidence set forth by Mr. 
Justice Agce in the opinion pl'ppared hy him for the Dis-
trict COllT't of A\ppeal (People V. Ilauen (Cal.App.) 26 Cal. 
Rptr. 650), it must be assumed that the trial court fully and 
fairly instructed the jUl'Y Oil all llllltprial issuc's presented to 
it amI that suell iustruetiom; followed the law. It must also 
be presumed that the jury,-in light of all the evidence ad-
dueed at the trial, as limited by the court's illstrnctions,-
d"tp!'mincd the ultimate qu('stions of fact dt·fined by the ill-
t;tl"llctioJll~ as to whether defendant volulltal'ily accompanied 
thc police offiecl's to his hotel room and voluntarily permit-
tpd them to searcll it. 
It must further be assullled that the jury fairly and im-
llartially weighed the cvidellce pursuant to the presumptively 
comprl'1lCnsive and valid iustructions and found substantial 
support for the material findinb"S of fact UpOll which the ulti-
mate admissibility of tllC evidence and, all issues upon which 
the jll(lgment of guilty was prNlicatcd. (Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 1!)(i3, subd. 15; People V. 1'arantinf), 45 Ca1.2d 590, 597 
[7J [290 P.2d 505J ; People V. Su,tic, 41 Cal.2d 483, 494 [9J 
[2(H P.~d 241J.) • 
I would th~I"'fol'(~ affirm th!' .judgmcnt. 
Schauer, J., concurred. 
